Letters from an Inquirer - Part 2
Regarding Catholicism and Eastern Orthodoxy
Above: Pope Saint Hormisdas (450-523 AD), who sat in the Chair of Peter from 514 until his death, and whose leadership brought an end to the Acacian Schism.
Mary:
What I mean by the East is Constantinople, or Antioch, or places that were outside Rome’s jurisdiction.
Wesley:
I assume you mean outside Rome’s Patriarchal jurisdiction only. The issue here is that if “East” refers to all the Patriarchates outside the West, then it includes all the Patriarchates except Rome, as Rome was the sole Patriarch of the West. But if that’s your meaning, then it’s incorrect to claim that the “East” didn't accept Papal authority. Do you see what I mean? If by “East” you simply mean not the West, then it becomes problematic when discussing Eastern Orthodox claims about what the East did or didn’t do. The East wasn’t a monolith—it consisted of multiple sees, often with divergent positions. And at any given time there was no unified East that rejected or merely acquiesced to Papal authority.
Mary:
I read that there were indeed some Eastern bishops that did accept the strong Papal claims in the formula of Pope Hormisdas, but that the Patriarch of Constantinople added something extra that now Eastern Orthodox use to diminish the Papal claims.
Wesley:
“Some Eastern bishops” (as you say) is a bit of an understatement, but let that pass. I have Ed Siecienski's book where you pulled your citation from. He says that the Formula of Pope Hormisdas “was an uncompromisingly Chalcedonian document that contained one of the strongest affirmations of Rome’s teaching authority ever accepted in the East.” That's before the part you quoted, which reads:
Justin made it clear to the Eastern bishops that they were expected to sign, which they eventually did. It is perhaps indicative of his reluctance to agree to such a complete capitulation that John II of Constantinople (518–20) added his own preface... John also made it clear that he adhered to the faith of the four councils, perhaps as a way of getting the pope to accept canon 3 of Constantinople, which had not been included among the councils recognized in the Decretum Gelasianum. [emphasis mine]
That's a lot of “perhaps”! This approach, used by Anglicans like Bishop Gore or F. W. Puller, attempts to sidestep the fact that nearly all the Eastern bishops, including Patriarch John, signed onto the Papal prerogatives in the Formula. We can delve into the details if you’d like, but the fact remains that they all agreed to it, and nothing in the preface suggests that John was trying to soften the force of the Papal claims.
That’s why so many “perhapses” are needed to speculate about what John might have intended between the lines: “Maybe he didn't really mean it, or maybe he said this to blunt the force of the Papal claims, or maybe...”. There are many ways in which the two Sees can be one—one in faith, in sacraments, in aim, in Christ, etc. There’s no reason to believe he meant that the two are one in some specific sense of authority and prerogative, especially after signing a Formula that explicitly states they are not!
Insofar as some bishops needed Justin’s prodding in order to sign the Formula, Siecienski doesn’t appear to acknowledge (that I'm aware of) that this was likely not because of the Papal claims therein, but because the Formula condemned Acacius of Constantinople, who was beloved by many in the East.
But again, even if all of them merely acquiesced while not being fully on board, that doesn’t speak in their favor at all, as I stated in a previous reply.
Mary:
The Eastern Orthodox allege that Rome had primacy only because it was the capital of the Empire.
Wesley:
This seems more true of Constantinople than Rome, which explains the former's obsession with title and status that we see in Canon 3 (Constantinople I in 381 AD), by which the see of Constantinople attempted to vault itself above Alexandria and Antioch. That canon was not accepted by the Bishops of Rome when they confirmed that council, and the similar Canon 28 of Chalcedon (451 AD) was explicitly nullified by Pope Saint Leo the Great. S. Herbert Scott's book The Eastern Churches and the Papacy has a great discussion of this allegation, and his conclusion is that it “is not till after the founding of Constantinople that the idea arises, even in the East, that the Roman primacy was simply the outcome of the city’s political rank” (page 41). I wonder why?
Mary:
Now my question is this: do you believe that the East (in general) had a different “ecclesiology” back then, as Orthodox now make it seem, than Rome?
Wesley:
Outside of generally vague terms like “collegial” or “conciliar”, which may confuse subsidiarity with lack of authority, I'm not aware of any singular view on Ecclesiology from history that the Eastern Orthodox Churches today would all accept.
On that note, here are two points worth mentioning:
First, the principle of subsidiarity states that functions best handled at a lower level should not be escalated to a higher one. If a bishop can effectively manage an issue, then the Metropolitan or Patriarch need not intervene—or even be informed. However, I often find that Protestants and Eastern Orthodox conflate a lack of universal jurisdiction with respect for subsidiarity. But you can possess a power that you rarely—or never—exercise, and practicing subsidiarity does not conflict with universal jurisdiction. The essence of subsidiarity is that higher authority should intervene only when necessary. For example, our Federal courts operate this way. Only a tiny fraction of cases reach the Supreme Court—those that couldn’t be resolved at lower levels.
Second, some Eastern Orthodox admit that the Pope had universal jurisdiction but claim it was only appellate, meaning he had to be appealed to before intervening. This is factually incorrect. But even if you disregard the historical evidence, you can still see that this view confuses power with procedure. As a matter of contingent fact, the most likely scenario for the Pope to exercise immediate jurisdiction (a power, de jure) would almost always begin with someone bringing an issue to him (a procedure, de facto). How else could he act? The Pope doesn't have eyes everywhere and can’t spend his time scouring the globe for opportunities to exercise his authority. But since, in practice, his intervention often follows an appeal of some sort, some argue that his jurisdiction is not immediate but merely appellate. Again, this conflates power with procedure, de facto with de jure. The Supreme Court has the widest jurisdiction of any court in America. But it can’t handle every case and doesn’t have eyes everywhere. It therefore needs certain procedures, like an appeals process, in order for it know when to properly exercise its power and what cases to apply its power to. But, in principle, the procedure could be different or change while the power remains; therefore, the power is not the procedure.
Just imagine, five hundred years in the future, looking back to now and inferring that the Supreme Court of the United States lacked universal jurisdiction, simply because it never had occasion to weigh in on a particular matter that was dealt with at a lower level; or imagine inferring it lacked immediate jurisdiction, simply because it relied on a procedure of appeals to order the cases that needed its judgment. We must be careful not to make the same mistaken inferences in church history.
I hope that helps!
… Continue to Part 3.